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THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE

c/

By Robert E. More of the Denver Bar

LTHOUGH there are earlier cases bearing on the
"Attractive Nuisance" Doctrine, there was little direct
discussion of it before 1870, and it is probable that
the general interest of the profession in the question was first
excited by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in 1873 in Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stout.'
In other countries the question has not received as much
judicial discussion as in the United States. Various English
cases have been cited in the American courts, but none of
them appears to be a direct decision. Thus Lynch v. Nurdin'
is often referred to as being in support of the doctrine of the
Stout case. In the English case, a man left his horse and
cart unattended in a public street. A child got upon the cart
in play and was hurt. The owner was held liable. There
the alleged "attractive" chattels were left in a public place
where the plaintiff and the defendant "had an equal right to
be." This, of course, is very different from the case where
the owner leaves the chattel on his own land, where the child
has no right to come. The distinction is clearly pointed out
by Mr. Justice Peckham in a leading New York case.' The
English authorities are in confusion.'
The point has been considered in the Scotch courts, but
the law there does not seem decisively settled.'
In Australia the court of New South Wales favors the
land owner.'
The Doctrine is, therefore, not only typically American,
but is chiefly developed in the American cases. The Stout

C

2-17 Wall. 657.
2-(1841) I Q.B. 29.
'-Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301 at 311, 312.

*-See Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 2nd Ed. 436; Bevtn on Negligence, 2nd Ed. 183-190.
--- See Glegg on Reparation, 231-232; and Guthrie Smith on Damages, 144-147.
-- See Patterson v. Borough of Woollahra, 16 New South Wales Law Reports-Cases of Law, 229;
also Slade v. Victorian Railway, 15 Victorian Law Reports, 190.
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case, as is well known, was one where a turntable owned by
a railroad was left unlocked and unguarded, although it was
so located that children could be attracted to it from places
where they might lawfully be, and although the railroad had
actual knowledge that children had been in the habit of playing upon it in the past.
Following the Stout case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the famous case of Keffe v. Milwaukee and St. Paul
R. Co. 7 fortified the Federal decision and laid down, it is sub-

mitted, sounder principles for the future application of the
doctrine.
Since that time, many courts have had occasion to accept
or reject in whole or in part the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
Courts of New Hampshire, Tennessee, Massachusetts and
New York have flatly refused to follow the Stout case, even
in the case of a turntable. In cases of alleged "dangerous
attractions" other than turntables, decisions favorable to the
land owner have been rendered in Arkansas, California, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
A very eminent authority upon the law of Torts has
argued at length that the doctrine is unsound and should never
be applied.'
From the welter of decisions on this subject, it is somewhat difficult to state definitely just what the law is. It is
believed, however, that the four general principles to be
developed hereinafter are supported not only by the numerical
weight of authority, but also by sound legal principles. What,
then, are the essential elements of the Attractive Nuisance
Doctrine as laid down in decisions by courts which support
this theory of a landowner's liability to children?
1. There is no general legal duty, either to children or
adults who enter defendant's Property without invitation,
express or implied, to keep dangerous things from one's land
or to use care about them.
-0(875)
21 Minn. 207.
'-See article by Jeremiah Smith in II Harvard Lato Review, at pages 349 and 434. This article
reviews all the cases that had been decided up to the time the article was published and
authorities in support of statements heretofore made may be found at the end of Judge Smith's
discussion. See also an article by Manley 0. Hudson in 36 H.L.R. 836.
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It is elementary that no duty is owed to trespassers, other
than the duty not to injure them wilfully. Accordingly,
where a trespasser has been injured, it is immaterial whether
or not defendant has failed to exercise due care. There being
no duty, the question of due care is never reached. Of course
defendant cannot injure plaintiff intentionally. Traps and
spring guns are within this latter category.
The Supreme Court of the United States held in a recent
decision, which modified the earlier holding in the Stout case
to a considerable degree, that "infants have no greater right
to go upon other people's land than adults, and the mere fact
that they are infants imposes no duty upon land owners to
expect them and prepare for them."'

This fundamental principle was recognized by the Colo-

rado Supreme Court in the case of Hayko v. Coal Company."°

There plaintiff, a boy ten years old, entered an open rough
board shack on defendant's premises and abstracted therefrom
a box of dynamite caps. Plaintiff tried to pick out the contents of one of the caps with a pin; it exploded and blew off
parts of several fingers. The plaintiff contended that the
shack and caps were an attractive nuisance and that in any
event defendant was negligent in keeping the caps where
children could get them. On this second proposition the
Court said:
"We know of no general legal duty either to children or adults who

enter without invitation, express or implied, to keep dangerous things from
one's land or to use care about them, and yet plaintiff's argument premises such
a duty. It may be conceded, as far as this point is concerned, that I may not
wilfully set a trap, e.g., a spring gun, that I owe a duty of care so as not to
entrap one whom I have impliedly invited, as by a walk and steps built up
to my front door, or a child whom I have tempted to trespass, and that what
would not be a trap to an older person would be to a very young one, but
these points do not reach the plaintiff's proposition and we do not assent to it."
2. The doctrine is inapplicable unless defendant knowingly keeps upon his premises in an unguarded condition an
instrumentality that is "unusually" alluring to children.

The Federal Supreme Court said in the United Zinc
Case supra:
'-United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van'Britt (decided March 27, 1922) 258 U. S. 268; 42 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 299; 66 Law Ed. 615 at 617.
"1---77 Colorado, 143.
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"On the other hand, the duty of one who invites another upon his land,
not to lead him into a trap, is well settled, and while it is very plain that
temptation is not invitation, it may be held that knowingly to establish and
expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically
as a fish, something that is certain to attract them, has the legal effect of an
invitation to them, although not to an adult. But the principle, if accepted,
must be very cautiously applied."

A few courts have failed to heed the admonition of the
Federal Supreme Court that the doctrine "must be cautiously
applied". The majority of jurisdictions, however, have
recognized that the doctrine must be narrowly limited and
that great injustice will result unless the Federal Supreme
Court's admonition isheeded.
This is the law in Colorado. In the Hayko case Judge
Denison said:
"Courts have said and held that it is negligent to maintain on one's
own premises any agency that is dangerous and attractive to children. This
proposition has been condemned by some courts and even ridiculed. * * *
It leads to such absurdities that it is easy to ridicule it; for example, an apple
tree bearing green apples is such an agency. It will not do to say that every
attractive thing is sufficient to charge a defendant with negligence in enticing
children to trespass, because there is nothing that can be said not to be attractive to a child. * * * The attraction must be unusual * * * and we think
that, as a matter of law, a shack in a mining camp is not an unusual attraction."

3. The doctrine is not applicable unless the instrumentality in question is so located that children can be attracted
to it without first committing a trespass.

It is obvious that this exceptional doctrine can have no
applicability unless the attractive, dangerous instrumentality
is so situated that children may be attracted by it when acting
within their rights. If the child must first become a trespasser
before he can even see the dangerous instrumentality in question, then the doctrine cannot be availed of by him.

The reason for this rule is apparent. We have the basic
principle that no duty is owed to a trespasser save to refrain
from injuring him wilfully or by traps. Even though a defendant carelessly maintains upon his premises a dangerous
instrumentality he is not liable to a trespasser for the very
obvious reason that he owes no duty to one who is trespassing.
Children are considered as invitees rather than trespassers,
IF defendant has maintained upon his premises something
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that is so "unusually" attractive that they are drawn to it "as
mechanically as a fish is drawn to a bait." But it is obvious
that the trespass is never excused nor the invitation implied
unless the child is in fact attracted by the alluring nuisance.
To put a clear case, if a ten-year-old boy climbs over the high
board fence surrounding the plant of the General Chemical
Company near Valverde, Colorado, and then while wandering around is attracted to a stationary ladder on a vat of sulphuric acid, climbs up and falls in it, it would be entirely
immaterial that this ladder and vat were the most attractive
things in the world, to children. The child was a trespasser
when he climbed over the fence. The ladder and vat were
not visible to him until AFTER he became a trespasser. His

trespass is not excused therefore by the attractive nuisance, as
the vat and ladder were not visible to the child when he was
at any place where he had a right to be. No implied invitation was extended to him to climb up the ladder. The child
was not following the figurative bait but was wilfully trespassing upon another's property.
The Supreme Court of Illinois" first announced this
qualification of the general doctrine. In the case just cited
the dangerous instrumentality was a hoist used by defendant
to elevate bricks and mortar in a building under construction.
Plaintiff went into the building without being attracted by
the hoist, and having thiss trespassed saw the hoist, put his
hand upon it and was injured. In holding for the defendant
the Court said, at page 170:
"It is a necessary element of the liability that the thing which causes
the injury is tempting to children, and constitutes a means of attracting them
upon the premises, which the owner should anticipate. The dangerous thing
must be so located so as to attract them from the street or some public place
where they may be expected to be. An owner would not be liable if he
maintained something for his own use which might be dangerous, but which
would only be found by the children going upon his premises as trespassers."

In the United Zinc Case, Supra, the Federal Supreme

Court adopted the Illinois rule.
This same distinction has been made by the Colorado
Supreme Court in the Hayko Case, Supra. The Court first
held that the shack itself was not "unusually attractive"; then
"--McDermott v. Burke, 256 I1. 401; 100 N. E. 168.
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in answer to plaintiff's contention that dynamite caps constituted an attractive nuisance, the Court pointed out that "plaintiff could not see the box of caps till he had trespassed, therefore, the caps cannot be classed as the attraction."
4. The doctrine is not applicable unless children have
been attracted by the nuisance before and defendant knows of
this fact.
In the United Zinc Case, Supra, Mr. Justice Holmes was

considering a poisonous body of water that looked clear and
attractive. This body of water had not been frequented by
children prior to this time and in holding for defendant, Mr.
Justice Holmes said at page 617:
"It does not appear that children were in the habit of going to the
place, so that foundation also fails."

In Hardy vs. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co."2 defendant main-

tained a concrete conduit, seven hundred feet long, covering
a shallow stream. The ends were open. At times defendant
discharged hot water from its boilers through this conduit.
A boy twelve years old attempted to walk through this conduit and was killed by a discharge of steam and hot water.
The evidence established that children had walked through
this conduit on at least three instances prior to the accident in
question, but there was no evidence that defendant knew this
fact. The lower coukt directed a verdict for defendant, and
the case was heard on appeal by Judges Sanborn, Stone and
Munger. In affirming the decision of the lower court, Judge
Stone says :".
"Nothing approaching knowledge by defendant of any passage through
the conduit of boys at any time was shown, and such knowledge cannot be
inferred nor imputed from the three trips in the course of four years shown
in the evidence. Such knowledge cannot be founded upon the circumstances
that children played about the openings of the conduit. There is no limit,
except physical ability, to what a child may do."

No attempt has been made to cover many of the numerous
fascinating branches of this doctrine. The few principles outlined above being sponsored by the Colorado Supreme Court,
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit or the Federal
'2--266 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 8th Circuit).
"-At page 861.
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Supreme Court are of interest to Colorado lawyers and cqntrolling in this state until these respective tribunals take a
different view of the matter. It is believed that these fundamentals will furnish a basis for deciding most attractive nuisance cases and are based upon sound legal principles. May
it be hoped, therefore, that in this jurisdiction the courts will
continue to adhere to this humane, logical and well supported
group of rules.

